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CerttoCA9 , ~ 
(Kilkenny, Choy, Good,win)~4-
~ · UNITED STATES ~ • 1.-
u\SCU,SS, Federal/crirnina~.--f ....... ~• ~\ 
CA 9 decisiot\ v • • e:z.,......,.~ ~ .... ~- . 
is t.uron~. ~u-f-~ ~ l.f) ~4 -d(..1 _.•1.._1ooo"Tlrnely, \nth 
..) ANTELOPE ••• L ~...., ....... .t_ 
1
, ~ • 1 J.. ~- c.-c~ ~tension 
0"~ Q i.s 
wk~•... 1. SUMMARY: The SG challenges CA 9 1 s conclusion that a portion of the 
\~$~ ~ Major Crimes~!~=e~o ~X:~n!!4~u:~~:~~  
Siq~if\c.a~\ ~-
~ '\1) 2. FACTS: In 1974 four men broke into a non-Indian 1 s house located on the 
'h\«. 1.41 Coeur d'Alene reservation. The four robbed the non-Indian and killed-;:: by~ 
~o;~! ~:: beating. Four enrolled Coeur d 1Alene Indians were indicted. Two of the men, 
1 
Ckr\s Antelope and L eonard Davison, were indicted of felonious entry of a non-Indian ho m • ...__ 
- z -
j 
on an Indian reservation in violation of 18 U.S. C. § 1153 and robbery in violation 
of 18 U.S. C. § § 1153 and 2111. Count II I of the indictment charged Antelope and 
Davison, as well as William Davison and Seyler, with killing the woman in the 
perpetration of the robberyi.nvio1a.tion of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 1111. Seyler \"':as 
granted immunity and testified at trial as a government witness. The jury found 
Antelope and Leonard Davison guilty of all three counts, including first degree 
murder under Count I I I. William Davison was convicted only of the lesser included 
offense of second degree murder on Count I I I. 
Resps appealed their convictions on the grounds that the murder provision of -
18 U.S. C. § 1153 was unconstitutional as applied to them. They claimed that it 
deprived them of equal protection and due process under the 5th Amendment througl~ 
an invidious racial discrimination without a proper government objective. 
CA 9 agreed with resps and reversed all three murder convictions. It aff'd 
the burglary and robbery convictions under counts I and I I as those had not been 
challenged. 
CA 9 first described the statutory framework governing crimes on Indian 
land. It noted that the crime of killing an Indian by an Indian (on Indian land) is 
governed by the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S. C. § 1153, which incorporates the 
federal definition of murder, 18 U.S. C. § 1111. Section 1111 defines murder 1 as 
including felony murder. The crime of killing an Indian by a non-Indian (on Indian 
land) is governed by the Federal Enclave Law, 18 U.S. C. § 1152, which also 
incorporates 18 U.S. C. § 1111. The crime of killing a non-Indian by an Indian (on 
Indian land) is also controlled by§ 1153 and§ 1111. However, the killing of a non-
Indian by a non-Indian in Indian country is a state crime. For this last statement 
CA 9 cited New York ex rei. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946); United States v. 
McBratney, 104 U.S . (14 Otto) 621 (1881); and United States v. Cleveland, 503 F. 2d 
l 06 7 (CA 9 1974). Thus, when a non-Indian kills a non-Indian the definition of 
murder is determined by reference to the situs state's law [and the case is tried 
in state court]. The Idaho provision for murder l requires proof of premeditation 
and deliberation. In Idaho felony murder is murder 2. [But murder 1 in Idaho 
carries a mandatory death penalty.] 
CA 9 then analyzed the equal protection claim as follows: In Idaho it is 
easier to get a murder l conviction under federal law than under state law because 
no proof of the mens rea element of premeditation and deliberation is required. 
Congress has granted to the federal courts jurisdiction of petrs 1 crime "solely 
on the basis of their race. 11 CA 9 then said that petrs 1 argument 11is not against the 
grant of jurisdiction itself, but rather against the accompanying definition of murder. 
CA 9 then said that "the sole basis for the disparate treatment of appellants and non-
Indians is that of race. 11 (Emphasis in original). CA 9 noted that in Gray v. 
United States, 394 F.2d 96 (CA 9 1967), cert denied, 393 U.S. 985 (196 8), it 
employed the doctrine of federal wardship in upholding the disparate sentencing 
in rape cases. It distinguished that case on the ground that there the disparity 
mitigated the penalty for Indians raping non-Indians "and thus inured to the Indians' 
ben efit. 11 Here CA 9 noted that the Indians were put at a disadvantage because - --
murder l was easier to prove under federal law. CA 9 noted that it dismissed the 
equal protection claim in Henry v. United States, 432 F. 2d 114 (CA 9 1970), ce r- t 
deni ed, 400 U.S. lOll (1971) (which held that an Indian erroneously charged und e r 
§ 1152 for his rape of two non-Indians on an Indian reservation rather than under 
§ 1153 was harmless error), on the ground that the law applied identical definitions 
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CA 9 cited New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946); Unit ed States v. 
McBratney, 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 621 (1881); and United States v. Cleveland, 503 F.2d 
1067 (CA 9 1974). Thus, when a non-Indian kills a non-Indian the definition of 
murder is determined by reference to the situs state 1 s law [and the case is tried 
in state court]. The Idaho provision for murder 1 requires proof of premeditation 
and deliberation. In Idaho felony murder is murder 2. [But murder 1 in Idaho 
carries a mandatory death penalty.] 
CA 9 then analyzed the equal protection claim as follows: In Idaho it is 
easier to get a murder 1 conviction under federal law than under state law because 
no proof of the mens rea element of premeditation and deliberation is required. 
Congress has granted to the federal courts jurisdiction of petrs 1 crime "solely 
on the basis of their race. 11 CA 9 then said that petrs 1 argument "is not against the 
grant of jurisdiction itself, but rather against the accompanying definition of murder. 
CA 9 then said that "the sole basis for the disparate treatment of appellants and non-
Indians is that of race." (Emphasis in original). CA 9 noted that in Gray v . 
United States, 394 F. 2d 96 (CA 9 1967), cert denied, 393 U.S. 985 (1968), it 
employed the doctrine of federal wardship in upholding the disparate sentencing 
in rape cases. It distinguished that case on the ground that there the disparity 
mitigated the penalty for Indians raping non-Indians "and thus inured to the Indians' 
benefit." Here CA 9 noted that the Indians were put at a disadvantage because - --
murder 1 was easier to prove under federal law. CA 9 noted that it dismissed the 
equal protection claim in Henry v. United States, 432 F. 2d 114 (CA 9 1970), ce Yt 
denied, 400 U.S. 1011 ( 1971) (which held that an Indian erroneously charged un d e :· 
§ 1152 for his rape of two non-Indians on an Indian reservation rather than under 
§ 1153 was harmless error), on the ground that the law applied identical definitions 
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of rape under either federal or Nevada law. CA 9 then noted its holding in Mull v. 
United States, 402 F.2d 571 (CA 9 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1107 (1969), "that 
when a statute does not subject the Indian defendant to any truly invidious racial 
discrimination (i. e., when he is not put in a genuinely disadvantageous position), 
it cannot be challenged on equal protection g J ounds. 11 Here CA 9 found that when 
Indians are at a serious "procedural or substantive disadvantage'' the case is 
different and one of first impression. 
CA 9 found the rationale of United States v. Cleveland, 503 F. 2d 106 7 (CA o 
1974), applicable. In Cleveland under § 1152 a non-Indian assaulting an Indian is 
subject to the application of federal law in the federal court while under§ 1153 
an Indian assaulting an Indian is subject to application of state law in the federal 
court. There the court noted that Indians were subject to more severe punishment 
than non-Indians and thus upheld the dismissal of the indictments as unconstitutiona E: 
discriminating against Indians. 
CA 9 then noted that the question was complicated in this case by the ab~enc e 
of federal jurisdiction against the comparative group, non-Indians killing non-Indian::: 
But CA 9 held that the government cannot accomplish through discriminatory 
jurisdiction what it cannot accomplish through discriminatory statutory coverage. 
It held that discriminatory treatment here cannot be justified by the federal ward sl-.i .. 
of Indians, citing Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, which held that Indians 
must be given lesser included offenses charges even though the lesser included 
offense is not expressly enumerated in the Major Crimes A ct. Finally CA 9 held 
that uniformity of federal law for multistate reservations is not a justification since 
for some of the crimes the Major Crimes Act incorporate state law definitions. 
- 5 -
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG contends that Congress may assert federal 
jurisdiction with respect to offenses in which an Indian is involved as accused or 
v ictim, leaving to states the prosecution of offenses involving only non-Indians -
without violating equal protection. 
The SG notes that while § 1152 on its face would apply to anyone committing 
a crime on Indian country, court made law limited its application only to crimes 
involving Indians. (See the cases cited by CA 9 supporting its statement that there 
is no federal jurisdiction for killing a non-Indian by a non-Indian. The cases 
justified the distinction on the ground that the state 1 s interest in enforcement of 
its law as to its citizens overshadowed the federal interest in exercising its trust 
responsibility over tribal Indians and their property.) The SG then states that if 
the line between federal and state jurisdiction is proper, then Congress need not 
define crimes which are within its sphere of jurisdiction in conformity with state 
law~· The Constitution provides for congressional authority over Indian affairs 
and provides that federal laws and treaties are supreme. The SG contends that 
the 11 discrimination 11 between Indian involved offenses and non-Indian offenses is 
reasonable because of the constitutionally mandated responsibilities of Congress 
with respect to matters involving Indians and the interest of the States in regulatin g 
relations among non-Indian citizens. 
The SG contends the legislative 11 discrimination 11 is not racial. The 
separate treatrnent of Indian affairs is a result of the Indians 1 former sovereignty 
and the United States 1 subsequent trust relationship. A person can cease being a ::. 
Indian legally, although not racially, by severing his ties with the tribe. Canadi an . 
South American and North American Indians of terminated tribes would not be 
- 6 -
considered India n s in this context. Additionally, any Indian or non-Indian tried 
for murder under federal court jurisdiction (under§ 1152 or 1153) is subject to 
I 
the definition of § 1111. 
that the result differs, but that is due to a recognition that state jurisdiction rather 
It is only if both the accus eel and victiln are non-Indians 
than federal governs the crime. 
The SG then distinguished Keeble and Cleveland (although not necessarily 
conceding that Cleveland is good law) on the ground that both involved differential 
treatment of Indians as opposed to non-Indians, both of whom were subject to 
federal jurisdiction for the same crime. Here one is subject to federal and the 
other to state jurisdiction. 
The SG contends this decision will lead to uncertainty in applying law to the 
major offenses. The SG contends that federal courts will have to apply a patchwork 
I 
law, taking the most lenient provisions from the state and federal laws relating 
to the same offenses. Here, the SG notes that while Idaho does not include felony 
murder as a murder 1 offense, Idaho has a mandatory death penalty for murder 1 
offenses which this federal crime does not. Therefore, had premeditation been 
proved, should the death penalty have applied? Presumably not. Additionally it 
is often difficult to determine what provisions of substantive and procedural law 
are more 11 lenient. 11 It might also lead to application of a combination of federal 
and state law that is more lenient than either one. Finally, Indians have an interest 
in law enforcement on their reservation. A requirement of 11 leniency 11 does not 
further that interest. 
The SG contends that the decision substantially affects law enforcement in 
/ 





California are unaffected by this decision however because P. L. 280 makes state 
criminal law applicable within all the reservations of that state.) 
Finally the SG contends that if Indians and non-Indians cannot be punished 
in different jurisdictions applying different laws, then the Court should reconstrue 
§ 1152 and have it apply to anyone who commits a crime in Indian country, regard-
less of th e identity of the accused or victim. 
In a footnote the SG notes that CA 9 rev'd the conviction of all three men, 
although one of them was convicted of murder 2, not murder 1. The SG notes that 
the prob.lem with the statutory scheme as seen by CA 9 only involved murder l and 
thus t he third conviction should not have been reversed. The SG does not find that 
error in<portant enough to seek cert on however. 
4. DISCUSSION: The SG' s argum.ents are persuasive, particularly as 
resps do not challenge the differential jurisdiction but rather challenge the 
application of law as a denial of equal protection. It would seem that if they do 
not challenge the jurisdiction, the jurisdiction must be assumed to be proper (and 
the SG also contends alternatively that it is or can be made so by reinterpretation). 
Onc e jurisdiction is established, federal law need not incorporate or be comparable 
with state law. 
It would also appear that the SG is right that this holding will make applica -
tion of any law confusing in the prosecution of crimes in many reservations within 
CA 9. 
There is fo response. 
12/10/75 
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Motion-of Respondents Xrd F'tancJ 
Davi s bn, et al. for leave to Proceed Further 
Herein In Forma Pauperis. Also Motion of 
Respondents Leonard Francis Davison, et al. 
for A]l?.ointment;.._Q f Counsel. Also Motion of 
Respondent Gabriel Francis Antelope for Leave 
to Proceed Further Herein In Forma Pauperis. 
Also Motion of Respondent Gabriel Francis 
Q/ A '~ Antelope for Appointment of Counse 1. 
f' ~\- SUMMARY: On February 23, the Court granted cert e review its 
,uJ'~ judgment reversing resps' convictions on grounds that the murder statute contained 
G~ in the Major Crimes Act is unconstitutional as applied to resps Indians. Resps 
Leonard Francis Davison and William Andrew Davison request leave to proceed 
in forma pauperis and the appointment of John W. Walker, Esq. of Moscow, Idaho, 
to represent them in this Court. Resp Antelope seeks in forma pauperis treatment 
and the appointment of Allen V. Bowles, Esq., of Moscow, Idaho, to represent 
him in this Court. 
As to all three resps, respective counsel state that affidavits in support of 
in forn<a pauperis relief have been forwarded for signing to resps and will 
- 2 -
eventually be filed with the Clerk. Such affidavits appear to be unnecessary as 
Mr. Walker (for the Davisons) and Mr. Bowles (for Antelope) were appointed 
by both the DC and CA (see, 18 U.S. C. §3006A(d)(6) ). 
DISCUSSION: Resps were treated as indigents in both courts below. More-
over, it appears that they remain incarcerated pending review in this Court. 
In forma pauperis relief appears warranted; although, for some reason and 
apparently at his own expense, Mr. Bowles filed a printed response in opposition 
to cert and a printed brief on the merits. 
Attached to resps Davisons' motion for appointment of counsel is a letter 
addressed to the Clerk by Mr. Walker explaining that the SG inadvertently failed 
to advise counsel for the Davisons of the Government's intention to petition for 
cert. Accordingly, the only response to the SG' s petn was filed by counsel for 
Antelope. 
Counsel for the Davisons asserts that his clients' interests conflict with 
Antelope's on the question of which resp actually caused the death of the victim. 
He argues that the Davisons are entitled to be represented by counsel in this 
Court. It should be noted again that the CA appointed counsel for the Davisons 
and separate counsel for Antelope. 
Inasmuch as Mr. Bowles has already filed a brief on the merits on behalf 
of Antelope, counsel for the Davisons should probably be allowed the opportunity 
to respond to the SG' s brief on the merits. However, the issues presented for 
review in this Court appear to be common to all three resps and it does not appear 
necessary that the Court appoint two attorneys to represent resps. 
The Court may wish to direct that the Clerk communicate with both counsel 
to request their cooperation in deciding upon one of them to be designated as 
appointed counsel in this Court and to present oral argument. In the alternative, 
- 3 -
Mr. Bowles should probably be appointed to represent all the resps in which 
case, if counsel deems it necessary, only a supplemental brief on the merits 
need be filed to advance the interests of the Davisons, 
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LFP/lab 1/3/77 
January 3, 1977 
75-661 United States v. Gabriel Francis 
Antelope, et al. 
The respondents, Indians, in the course of robbing a 
non-Indian on an Indian reservation in Idaho, murdered the robbery 
victim. Because the accused persons (later convicted) were 
Indians, the victim was a non-Indian, and the crimes occurred 
in Indian country, and further because the crimes were offenses 
specifically enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 1153, the crimes came within 
the jurisdiction of the federal district court. 
Respondents were indicted and tried on a felony murder 
theory, authorized by 18 U.S.C. 1153 and 1111. Under these federal 
provisions, the government's burden of proof was less strict than 
under the Idaho homicide statute, which does not contain the felony 
murder doctrine. Thus, under Idaho law a conviction for first-degree 
murder would require proof of premeditation and deliberation, 
elements not required under the federal felony murder statutes. 
Opinion of CA 9 
CA 9 sustained respondents' position that the federal 
statutes (§§ 1153 and 1111) ~ applied constituted invidious racial 
discrimination violative of the Fifth Amendment. It noted that 
I 
if the non-Indian victim had been murdered by a non-Indian, the 
latter would have been tried under Idaho rather than Federal law; 
and under Idaho law, with no provision for felony murder, this 
state would have had the heavier burden of proving premeditation 
and deliberation. CA 9 concluded that "the sole basis for the 
dispirit treatment of [respondents] is that of race". And, in 
taking note of the government's argument that the issue was one 
of federal jurisdiction rather than an invidious classification, 
CA 9 said: 
"The government should not be permitted to 
accomplish through discriminatory jurisdiction 
what it cannot do through discriminatory 
statutory coverage when both Indian and non-
Indian defendants are jurisdictionally covered." 
Respondents largely track, with considerable amplification, 
the rationale of CA 9. The brief on behalf of respondents 
William and Leonard Davison is considerably better than that 
filed on behalf of Antelope. 
Position of the Government 
The SG, on behalf of the government, denies with more than 
usual vigor the existence of racial discrimination. The alleged 
discrimination arises not from any invidious classification but 
solely from federal court jurisdiction over some offenses and 
-.............. ~ .._....-. 4iWi' ... 
not over others. The federal statutes are neutral on their 
face: 
"The statute under which respondents were convicted 
of murder in the first degree, 18 U.S.C. 1111, 
applies to all persons charged with homicide in the 
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States (which, by operation of Sections 
1152 and 1153, includes Indian country), regardless 
of race, national origin, political status, or any 
other characteristic. In other words, any person 
who commits murder in the course of a robbery taking 
place on a military base or a vessel of the United 
States on the high seas -- whether Indian or non-
Indian -- is equally liable to conviction for murder 
in the first degree. The same is true in the case 
of the killing of an Indian in Indian country. 
In short, nothing anywhere in the United States 
Code affirmatively provides for different treatment 
of Indians and non-Indians charged with murder. The 
possibility of differential treatment arises only 
because, out of the entire universe of murderers 
potentially subject to federal court jurisdiction 
and to the application of substantive federal law 
by virtue of the geographical location of their 
offense, one group -- non-Indians who commit crimes 
against other non-Indians in Indian country -- is 
outside the reach of the present federal statutes 
governing crimes committed in Indian country. 
(SG's brief, at 13). 
Although emphasizing primarily that the statute applies 
equally to any homicide within federal criminal jurisdiction 
regardless of race of the defendant, the SG also notes that 
the regulation of Indian affairs does not derive from race but 
rather from the special status of the tribes that we have 
emphasized in so many cases. 
The SG makes a rather strong policy argument to the 
effect that the principle adopted by CA 9 (requiring equality 
of penalties imposed by the same crime under federal and state 
law) would lead to confusion if not the impossibility of enforcing 
criminal law in Indian country. The decision would require a 
comparison of state and federal law to determine which is more 
lenient, with federal law to be inapplicable whenever state law 
is more lenient. Indeed, as the SG notes, it is often impossible 
to determine which is more lenient. 
The SG asserts that, as "a practical matter", if the 
analysis of CA 9 is sustained, Congress would be forced either 
to assert exclusive federal jurisdiction over all offenses 
occurring in Indian country, thereby increasing federal 
responsibility beyond the needs of its trusteeship, or to 
provide that all offenses be governed by state law -- renouncing 
to this extent the supremacy of federal law in Indian country. 
Finally, the SG urges that, in the event we agree with 
CA 9, we should construe -- to avoid a chaotic result --
18 u.s.c. 1152 to include all offenses committed in Indian 
country. It is noted that the first paragraph of § 1152 
requires the application of general federal enclave law to all 
offenses committed in Indian country, regardless of the identity 
of the accused but this Court in McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 
interpreted Congressional intent -- in enacting predecessors 
of § 1152 -- as not extending federal jurisdiction to crimes 
between non-Indians. The SG says that if we agree with CA 9 
in this case, we should reconsider McBratney and its progeny. 
Comment 
Although I am not entirely at rest, I am impressed by 
the SG's argument that we are dealing here with facially neutral 
statutes conferring federal jurisdiction. The discrimination 
if it can be so characterized -- results from the difference 
in the laws of different jurisdiction, federal and state. 
January 17, 1977 
BENCH MEMO 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Dave Martin 
No. 75-661 Bnited Staees v. Antelope 
in Indian country 
Offenses committed SRXXRaiaRxxexexxaxisRx/are covered 
by a complicated set of jurisdictional and substantive 
statutes. The standards to be applied (state law or federal 
law) and the forum where the offender will be a tried (stat~ 
federal or tribal court) vary--not according to any neat 
pattern--depending on the offense and the Indian or 
non-Indian status of the offender. +18•8 ili!R huUialil wurdnud 
,1!1:8< 
_,. aan-Tndiae, and feeeral law i:&nteK»e/applied ;n ieeel!t!tl 
eenif1ii It certainly cannot be said that the overall result 
ixxgeRexaii~xkaxxkex generally disadvantages either Indians 
or non-Indians by subjecting them to stiffer penalties or 
less favorable procedural rules. And no claim could be 
sustained that the whole complicated structure was adopted 
with the purpose of harming one group or the other. (Thus 
proposed 
under the standard articulated in Justice Stewart's/concurrence 
in United Jewish Organizations, there is no equal protection 
violation--i.e., there has been no purpose to discriminate 
in the sense of intent to harm or disadvantage a particular 
group.) 
But it happens here that these particular defendants 
are arguably disadvantaged when compared to a hypothetical 
--~-
non-Indian accomplice in the crime who would have been tried 
-2-
in state courts under xxaxa Idaho law. For Idaho law, unlike 
federal law, contains no felony-murder provision. CA9 held 
that this amounted to invidious racial discrimination, and it 
therefore struck down resps' convictions. The question is a 
tricky one, but I agree with the SG that CA9 should be reversed. 
~ Current 
The key issue is whether the axxaxxi~RX8f/federal juris-
dictional pattern is con&itutionally valid, for it is only 
in the jurisdictional pattern that there is any "racial" 
distinction. There is no distinction based on race in the 
murder 
substantive/provisions tm t apply. All murderers within federal 
~Hxxi jurisdiction, regardless of race, are subject to the ------
felony murder rule. [This fact distinguishes cases such as 
United States v. Cleveland, 503 F.2d 1067 (CA9 1974). There 
Indian defendants were charged with assault with a deadly 
weapon. ~ixiaxiixY~8~R~xSxll3~x~ They came within 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1153, which at that time provided for punishment of that 
crime in accordance with state law--albeit in federal court and 
as a matter of federal law. A non-Indian committing the same 
crime would have come within§ 1152--i.e., still within federal 
court and federal law--, but § 1152 provides for application 
of specific federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 113, to assaults. The 
possible pun~hment under § 113 was substantially less. The 
court found this to be invidious discrimination. -- I think 
I agree with that result, because there federal substantive 
law applied to both Indian and non-Indian defendants, but 
harshness of penalty varied based only on the "race" of the 
offender. Such a difference is more overt and more offensive 
than the iR£iaaRxal difference involved here, which stems only 
incidentally from the fact of limited federal jurisdiction. 
-3-
I am not sure I have expressed the difference adequately, 
but the pmint is that Cleveland is distinguishable. Moreover, 
Congress has acted, in Pub. L. No. 94-297, to remedy the 
discrimination Cleveland condemned. The new statate has no 
( ~ Cl"fY i'S appst- AQ.(,) 
bearing on our case~ 
Although the issue has never been squarely decided, 
it seems fairly clear that Congress could have exerted federal 
jurisdiction over all offenses committed in Indian country. 
However, in a line of cases beginning with U.S. v. McBratney, 
104 U.S. 621, this court has construed the relevant acts so 
that a state retains jurisdiction over such offenses when 
committed by a non-Indian on a non-Indian victim. The question 
here is really whether confining jurisdiction in that way is 
inevitable 
permissible when the/effect is occasionally to disadvantage 
sRxg one group or the other. 
If this is to be treated as a strictly racial line, 
therefore subject to strictest serutiny, then CA9 was probably 
right. I have no doubt but that the Court would strike down 
a hypothetical statute subjecting ail offenses on military 
bases to federal jurisdiction, except when the offender was 
xkixH¥ black. Drawing that kind of a black-white line would 
be highly offensive, but perhaps more to the point, it would 
be irrational. It simply could not serve any legitimate 
purpose, nor has it any respectable historical antecedents. 
the SG 
It could not stand~ even if ix/could kH show that state law 
was uniformly more favorable to the black defendants. 
-4-
But I do not think xkix the discri ~inatio~would--or 
should--be considered equally pernicious as the black-white 
discrimination just hypothesized. There are two possible 
grounds for not finding the line drawn here to be "racial" 
in the sense that it calls for strictest scrutiny. (1) Not 
all racial Indians are considered Indians under § 1153. This 
point is made in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-554. 
Blood 
Aindians not recognized as part of federally protected tribes 
would not be included. The SG makes this point, but I do not 
think it deserves great reliance. For one thing, axRsRxlRaiaR 
someone without Indian blood can apP.arently not be considerel 
().<;. "'· ~" 'f.r v.s. S"t7. 
an Indian under the statute even if so recogn~zed by a tribe.A 
Moreover, it seems quite a difficult thing for someone once 
recognized as an Indian to disaffiliate. So the class may not 
be strictly racial--and this is not unimportant--but it still 
has many of the characteristics that make us uneasy about 
racial classifications. 
(2) Moret important is simply the history of this 
nation's relations with the Indians. A number of our cases 
emphasize that relationship is "unique," "anomalous," or 
"sui generis." Without this history one might well be called 
~.s ~tAoS~ 
upon to treatAthis aix differential treatment based on 
Indian-ness)~ easpec~ but with it, a different standard 
applies. It was stated in Mancari, 417 U.S., at 555: "As 
long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the 
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, 
such legislative judgments will not be distnrbed." This standard 
-5-
was applied in a jurisdictional setting just last term in 
v 
Fisher v. fDistrict Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390-391, sustaining 
the differential jurisdiction. 
I think the jurisdictional pattern here is rationally 
tied to Congress' obligation. It makes sense for Congress 
to take federal jurisdiction when Indians are involved as 
perpetrators or victims, for then tribal matters are closely 
implicated. When no Indians are involved, the xxihalxliRkx 
impact on tribal matters is less direct, and Congress could 
rationally conclude that such matters should be left to 
state authority. That in some cases this pattern will incidenmlly 
result in somewhat harsher rules being applied to Indian 




PUBLIC LAW 94-297 [S. 2129]; May 29, 1976 
INDIAN CRIMES ACT OF 1976 
For Legislat-ive History of Act, seep. 1641 
An Act to provide for the definition and punishment of certain crimes in 
accordance with the Federal laws in force within the special mari· 
time and territorial jurisdiction of the United States when said crimes 
are committed by an ·Indian in order to insure equal treatm ent for 
Indian and non-Indian offendera. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may 
be cited as the "Indian Crimes Act of 1976". 
SEC. 2. Section 1153, title 18, United States Code, is amended to 
read as follows: 
"§ 1153. Offenses committed within Indian country 
"A:rcy Indian who commits against the person or property of 
another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely, 
murder, manslaughter, kidnaping, rape, carnal knowledge of any 
female, not his wlfe, who has not attained the age of sixteen years, 
assault with intent to commit rape, incest, assault with intent to com-
mit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in 
serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robber}', and larceny within 
the Indian country, shall be subject to the same laws and penalties 
as all other persons committi~~ any of the a.bove offenses, w1thin the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the united States. 
"As used in this section, the offenses of burglary and incest shall 
be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in 
which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such 
offense. 
"In addition to the offenses of burglary and incest, any other of the 
above offenses which are not defined and punished by Federal law in 
force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be 
defined and punished in :u:cordance with the laws of the State in 
which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such 
offense.". , · · 
SEc. 3. Section 113 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by 
addini at the end thereof the following new subsection: ' 
"(f Assault resulting in serious bodily injury, by fine of not more 
than 10,000 or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.". 
90 STAT. 585 
Indian Crimes 
Act of 1976. 




P.L. 94-297 LAWS OF 94th CON G.-2nd SESS. May 29 
SEc. 4. Sedion 3242, title 18, United States Code, is amended to 
read as follows: 
"§ 3242. Indians committing certain offenses; acts on reservations 
"All Indians committing a:ny offense listed in the first paz-agraph 
of and punishable under section 1'153 (relating to offenses committed 
, within Indian country) of this title shall be tried in the same courts 
and in the same manner as are all other persons committing such 
offense within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.". 
Approved May 29, 1976. 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: 
HOUSE REPORT No. 94-1038 (Comm. on the Judiciary). 
SENATE REPORT No. 94-620 (Comm. on the Judiciary). 
CCNGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 122 (1976): 
Feb. 4
1 
considered and passed Senate. 
May 18
1 
considered and passed House, amended. 
May 20, Senate concurred in House amendment. 




An Act to authorize f1 
Quality. 
Be it enacted by 
United States of An 
the Environmental 
4-374) is amended to 
"SEc. 205. There : 
operations of the 0 
on Environmental ( 
following fiscal wa 
in Public Law 91':_19 
" (a) $2,000,0 
" (b) $1'>00,001 
tember 30, 197 
" (c) $3,000,0 
" (d) $3,000,C 
Approved Ma 
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Mr. Chief Justice Burger deliv(~ 4 
opinion of the Court. \. 
The question presented by our gra~1-
of certiorari is whether, under .the ci~- C::~. \ 
stances of this case, federal criminal statutes ~ 
violate the· Due Process Clause of the Fiftf _ J 
Amendment by subjecting individuals to z/t J zt11 
by virtue of their 
as Indians. 
(1) 
On the night of February 18, 1974, 
respondents, enrolled Coeur d 1 Alene Indians, 
broke into the home of Emma Johnson, an 81-year 
-/o ., j..~ ~ c.,-u. ;-rtf I tJ-:1 
~·~ IR'v.s:c. old non-Indian, in Worley, Idaho; they 
£ t~~ -~~ ~obbed and killed Mrs. Johnson. Because the 
~ w~1,. 
~ ·~ ~ . crimes were committed by enrolled Indians 
) ~·tfl... l ~ ~ f· r-; ,, l ~v::· thin the boundaries of the Coeur d'Alene 
~ffl~· ndian Reservation, respondents were subject 
-1 -'~ ~ ' to federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes 
~r-~- . y 'ft ... --;I ·;:; ~ '•.s;.,...J2...Act. ~8 u.s.c. § 1153. They were, 
\..'3 . ()_ . "' ~ i:L.. ~ accord1ngly, indicted by a federal grand j u~~ 
1\ · &", #......~: ~ fJ 1 1. ~ on charges of burglary, robbery and murder.-
~ 541' .... •..& .,-c.. 
"-~ ._,.A,_ ... ~..,__.,.J Respondent William Davison was convicted 
~P.L ~ . tt ·'-'~~ 
I i.l . ~.of sez d-degree murder only. Respondents 
t 'f) ~ z .y-. ~ ~ab(/el Francis Antelope and Leonard Davison 
~ ··~ .. •t--v. ~'fo ~v.N.C. ~~v. ;e._. 
~-
-2-
were found guilty of all three crimes as 
charged, including first-degree murder under 
' 
the felony-murder provisions of 18 U.S.C. 
3/ 
§ 1111,- as made applicable to enrolled 
Indians by 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
(2) 
In the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, respondents contended 
that their felony murder convictions were 
unlawful as products of invidious racial 
discrimination. They argued that a non-Indian 
charged with precisely the same offense, 
namely the murder of another non-Indian within 
4/ 
Indian country,- would have been subject to 
prosecution only under Idaho law, which 
in contrast to the federal murder statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 1111, does not contain a felony 
5/ 
murder provision.- To establish the crime of 
first-degree murder in state court, therefore, 
Idaho would have had to prove premeditation 
and deliberation. No such elements were 
required under the felony-murder component 
of 18 u.s.c. § 1111. 
Because of the difference between Idaho 
and federal law, the Court of Appeals concluded 
that respondents · were "put at a serious 
racially~based disadvantage," 523 F.2d 400, 
, .. 
-3-
406 (CA 9 1975), since the federal government 
was not required to establish premeditation 
~ 
and deliberation in respondents' federal 
prosecution. This disparity, so the Court 
of Appeals concluded, violated equal protec-
tion requirements implicit in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We granted 
fueUnited States' petition for certiorari, 
424 U.S. 907 (1976), and we reverse. 
(3) 
The decisions of this Court leave no 
doubt that federal legislation with respect 
to Indian tribes, although relating to 
Indians as such, is not based upon impermissible 
racial classifications. Quite the contrary, 
classifications expressly singling out Indian 
tribes as subjects of legislation are expressly 
6/ 
provided for in the Constitution . - and supported 
by the ensuing history of the Federal Govern-
ment's relations with Indians. 
" .•. Indian tribes are unique aggrega-
tions possessing attributes of sover-
eignty over both their members and 
their territory, Worcester v. Georgia, 
6 Pet. 515, 557 (1832); they are 'a 
separate people' possessing the power 
of regulating their internal and 
social relations ..•• '" United States 
v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975). 
Legislation with respect to these "unique 
aggregations" has repeatedly been sustained by 
-4- .. 
this Court against claims of unlawful racial 
discrimination. In upholding a limited 
,.. 
employment preference for Indians in the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, we said in Morton v. Mancari, 
417 u.s. 535 (1974): 
"Literally every piece of legislation 
dealing with Indian tribes and 
reservations .•. single out for special 
treatment a constituency of tribal 
Indians living on or near reservations. 
If these laws ... were deemed invidious 
racial discrimination, an entire Title 
of the United States Code (25 u.s.c.) 
would be effectively erased .•.. " Id., 
at 552. -
In light of thafresult, the Court unanimously 
concluded in Mancari: 
"The preference, as applied,is 
granted to Indians not as a discrete 
racial group, but, rather, as members 
of quasi-sovereign tribal entities ..•. " 
Id., at 554. 
Last Term, in Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 
382 (1976), we held that members of the Northern 
Cheyenne Tribe could be denied access to 
Montana state courts in connection with an 
adoption proceeding arising on their Reservation. 
Unlike Mancari, the Indian plaintiffs in Fisher 
were being denied a benefit or privilege 
available to non-Indians; nevertheless, a 
unanimous Court dismissed the claim of racial 
discrimination: 
"Finally, we reject the argument 
that denying [the Indian plaintiffs] 
access to the Montana courts constitutes 
----~--o;;J·-------
. . 
" ,· f 
impermissible racial discrimination. 
The exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Tribal Court does not derive from 
the race of the plaintiff but rather 
from the quasi-sovereign status of 
the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under 
federal law." ,424 U.S., at 390. 
Both Mancari and Fisher involved pre-
ferences or disabilities directly promoting 
Indian interests in self-government, whereas 
in the present case we are dealing not with 
matters of tribal self-regulation, but with 
federal regulation of criminal conduct within 
Indian country implicating Indian interests. 
But the principles reaffirmed in Mancari and 
Fisher point more broadly to the conclusion 
that federal regulation of Indian affairs is 
not based upon impermissible classifications. 
Rather, such regulation is rooted in the unique 
status of Indians as "a separate people" 
with their own political institutions. Federal 
regulation of Indians, therefore, is governance 
of @[e remnants ~ce-sovereign political 
communities; it is not to be viewed as legis-
lation of a "'racial' group consisting of 
'Indians •.•• '" Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S., 
at 553 n.24. Indeed, respondents were 
not subjected to federal criminal jurisdiction 
because they are of the Indian race but 
because they were enrolled members of the 
7/ 
Coeur d'Alene Tribe.- We therefore con-
elude that federal criminal statutes enforced 
" here are based neither in wholeror in part 
upon impermissible racial classifications. 
l~) 
The challenged statutes do not otherwise 
8/ 
violate equal protection.- We have previously 
observed that Indians indicted under the Major 
Crimes Act enjoy the same procedural benefits 
and privileges as all other persons within 
federal jurisdiction. Keeble v. United States, 
4 12 U . S . 2 0 5 , 212 ( 19 7 3 ) . See (U . S . C . § 3 2 4 2 • 
Respondents were, therefore, subjected to 
the same body of law as any other individual, 
Indian or non-Indian, charged with first-degree 
9/ 
murder committed in a federal enclave.- They 
do not, and could not, contend otherwise. 
There remains, then, only the disparity 
between federal and Idaho law as the basis for 
10/ 
respondents' equal protection claim.--Since 
Congress has undoubted constitutional power 
to prescribe a criminal code applicable in 
Indian country, United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 
375 (1886), it is of no consequence that the 
federal scheme -differs from a state criminal _ 
code otherwise applicable within the 
boundaries of the State of Idaho. Under our 
- 7 -
. ' 
federal system, the National Government does 
not violate equal protection when its own 
11/ 
body of law is even-handed-,- regardless of 
the laws of States with respect to the same 
12/ 
subject matter.--
The federal government treated respondents 
in the same manner as all other persons within 
federal jurisdiction, pursuant to a regulatory 
scheme that did not erect impermissible 
racial classifications; hence, no violation 
of the Due Process Clause infected respondents' 
13/ 
convictions. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 




18 U.S.C. 1153 provides in pertinent part: 
"Any Indian who commits against the person 
or property of another Indian or other person any 
of the following offe nses, namely, murder, mans laughte 
rape, carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife, 
who has not attained the age of sixteen years, assault 
with intent to commit rape, incest, assault with 
intent to kill, assault with a dangerous we a pon, 
assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, 
burglary, robbery, and larceny within the Indian 
country, shall be subject to the same laws and penal-
ties as all other persons committing any o f the above 
offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States." 
The background leading up to enactment of the Major Crimes Act is 
discussed in Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 209-212 (197 3 
As noted in that case, the Government has characterized the Major 
Crime Act as "a carefully limited intrusion of federal power into 
the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes to 
punish Indians for crimes committed on Indian land." Id., at 209 
?:_I 
Except for the offenses enumerated in the Major Crimes Act, all 
crimes committed by enrolled Indians against other Indians within 
Indian country are subject to the jurisdiction .Jf tribal courts. 
18 U.S.C. § 1152. Not all crimes committed within Indian country 
are subject to federal or tr~ jurisdiction, however. Under 
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881), a non-Indian 
charged with committing crimes against other non-Indians in India 
country is subject to prosecution under state law. S.t.~~... c;t.JU'V VIr ·Jtt~, 
. --------·~--
'}./ 
18 U.S.C. §1111 is the federal murder statute. It provides 
in pertinent part: 
"(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a 
human being with malice aforethought. Every 
murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or 
any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, 
and premeditated killing; or committed in the 
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any 
arson, rape, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated 
from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously 
to effect the death of any human being other than him 
who is killed, is murder in the first degree. 
Any other murder is murder in the second degree. 
It should be noted that respondent William Davison was 
convicted only of second-degree murder, not felony murder, under 
18 u.s.c. §1111. 
See n.2, supra. Federal law ostensibly extends federal 
jurisdiction to all crimes occurring in Indian country, except 
offenses subject to tribal jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. §1152. However, 
under United States v. McBratney, supra, and cases that followed, 
this Court construed §1152 and its predecessors as not applying 
to crimes by non-Indians against other non-Indians. Thus, respondents 
correctly argued that, had the perpetrators of the crimes been 
non-Indians the courts of Idaho would have had jurisdiction over 
these charges. 
~/ 
Idaho statutes contain the following definition of first-
degree murder: 
"All murder which is perpetrated by means of 
poison, or lying in wait, torture, or by any other 
kind of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated 
killing is murder of the first degree. Any murder 
of any peace officer of this state or of any 
municipal corporation or political subdivision 
thereof, when the officer is acting in line of duty, 
shall be murder in the first degree. *** All other 
kinds of murder are ot the second degree." Idaho 





Footnotes - 3. 
5/-cont. 
Idaho law provides for a mandatory death sentence for first-
v. N . e:. .. 
~/ 
Article I, §8, of the Constitution gives Congress power 
"[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian tribes." 
?_I 
As was true in Mancari, federal jurisdiction under the 
Major Crimes Act does not apply to "many individuals who are 
racially to be classified as 'Indians.'" 417 U.S., at 553 n.24. 
Thus, the prosecution in this case offered proof that r e spondents 
were enrolled members of the Coeur d'Alene Tribe and thus not 
emancipated from tribal relations. Moreover, members of Tribes 
whose official status has been terminated by congressional 
enactment are no longer subject, by virtue of their status, to 
federal criminal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act. United 
States v. Heath, 509 F.2d 16, 19 (CA 9 1974) ('While anthropologically 
a Klamath Indian even after the Termination Act obviously remains 
an Indian, his unique status vis-a-vis the Federal Government no 
longer exists.•) In addition, as enrolled tribal members, respondents 
were subjected to federal jurisdiction only because their crimes 
""';o: r" 14 
Indianl\. Reser~at-ion. Iff 0.).<'.{11.\/, 
Crimes occurring elsewhere would not be subject to exclusive 
federal jurisdiction. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 
392, 397 n.ll (1968). 
Footnotes - "' 
2_/-cont. 
It should be noted, however, that enrollment in an official 
Tribe has not been held to be an absolute requirement for federal 
jurisdiction, at least where the Indian defendant lived on the 
reservation and "maintained tribal relations with the Indians 
thereon." Ex parte Pero, 99 F.2d 28, 30 (CA 7 1938). See also 
United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 953 (CA 9 1974) (dicta). Since 
respondents are enrolled tribal members, we are not called on to 
decide whether non-enrolled Indians are subject to 18 U.S.C. §1153~ 
and we therefore intimate no views on the matter. 
~/ 
Other than their argument t~at the federal statutes create 
an invidious racial classification, respondents do not seriously 
contend that application of federal law to Indian tribes is so 
irrational as to deny equal protection. See n.6, supra ~ They do 
point, however, to Congress' relinquishment of criminal juris-
diction over Indians in six States pursuant to P.L. 280, 18 U.S.C. 
§1162. But P.L. 280 is simply one manifestation of Congress' 
continuing concern with the welfare of Indian tribes under federal 
guardianship. Indeed, in adopting P.L. 280, Congress 3ingled out 
certain Reservations to remain subject to federal criminal juris-
diction. Congress' selective approach in P.L. 280 reinforces, 
rather than undermines, the conclusion that legislation directed 
(_~<\d 
4o~wara Indian tribes is a necessary and appropriate consequence 
of federal guardianship under the Constitution. 
' ' 
Antelope Footnotes - 5. 
Federal jurisdiction would extend to crimes, regardless 
of the race of the perpetrator or victim, committed on federal 
enclaves, such as military installations, or on vessels of the 
United States on the high seas. 
lQ/ 
Respondents base their equal-protection claim on the 
assumption that they have been disadvantaged by being prosecuted 
under federal law. In their view, their murder convictions were 
made more likely by the fact that federal prosecutors were not 
required to prove premeditation. Respondents essentially ignore, 
however, the fact that Idaho law provided the death penalty for 
first-degree murder, whereas federal law provides for life 
imprisonment as the maximum sentence. Moreover, they do not 
seriously question that the evidence adduced at their federal 
trial might well have supported a finding of premeditation and 
deliberation, since respondents were found to have beaten and 
kicked Mrs. Johnson to death during the course of a planned 
robbery. Under these circumstnVces, it is largely a matter of 
speculation whether, and to what extent, respondents have been 
"disadvantaged" at all by be1ng prosecuted under federal law. 
It should be noted, however, that this Court has con-
sistently upheld federal regulations aimed solely at tribal Indians, 
as opposed to all persons subject to federal jurisdiction. See, 
~.,United States v. Holliday, 3 Wall. 407, 417-418 (1866); 
Footnotes - 6. 
1!_1-cont. 
Perrin v. United States, 232 u.s. 478, 482 (1914). See also 
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v.Kneip, Slip opinion, at 30 n.47 (1977). 
Indeed, the Constitution itself provides support for legislation 
directed specifically at the Indian tribes. See n.6 supra. As 
the Court noted in Morton v. Mancari, supra, the Constitution 
therefore "singles Indians out as a proper subject for separate 
legislation." 417 U.S., at 552. 
In this regard, we are not concerned with instances in 
which Indians tried in federal court are subjected to differing 
l o.~~/e 
penalties and burdens of proof from those &p~eft to non-
Indians charged with the same offense. Compare United States v. 
Big Crow, 523 F.2d 955 (CA 8 1976), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 920 
(1976), and United States v. Cleveland, 503 F.2d 1067 (CA 9 1974), 
with United States v. Analla, 490 F.2d 1204 (CA 10), vacated, 419 
u.s. 813 (1974). See P.L. 94-297 (1976) (which provides for 
uniform penalties for both Indians and non-Indians charged with 
assault resulting in serious bodily injury). That issue is not 
lY 
Indeed, had respondents been prosecuted under state law, 
they may well have argued, under this Court's holding in Seymour 
v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962), that the state conviction 
was void for want of jurisdiction. In Seymour, an enrolled member 
of the Colville Indian Tribe was convicted in state court of 
attempted burglary within Indian country. In reversing the 




"Since the burglary with which 
petitioner was charged occurred on 
property ... within the . [Indian] 
reservation, the courts of Washington 
had no jurisdiction to try him for that 
offense." Id., at 359. 
If state courts would have had no jurisdiction over respondents' 
case, then state law does not constitute a meaningful point of 
reference for establishing a claim of equal protection. 
1~/ 
If we accepted respondents' contentions, persons charged 
with crimes on federal military bases or other federal enclaves 
could demand that their federal prosecfBAons be governed by state 
law to the extent that state law was more "lenient" than federal 
law. The Constitution does not authorize this kind of gamesman-
ship. Indeed, any such rule, even assuming its workability, is 
flatly inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, 
Art. VI, cl. 2. Moreover, many of this Court's decisions invalidate 
attempts by the States to regulate Indian interests within the 
Reservations. As the Court stated in McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Commission 411 U.S. 164, 170-17l,"'State laws generally are 
not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except 
where Congress has expressly provided that State laws shall apply.'" 
See also, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, Slip opinion, at 19~ 
'Q9cided April ~(1977). 











Please join me. 
I do bave two or three minor suggestions that I have 
noted on the enclosed copy of your opinion. 
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.§u:vr~tttt C'Jcnrl ~f f.lrt ~f.tlt ~htttll' 
~all'Jringhtn. ~. or. 2ll6J~$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 12, 1977 
Re: 75-661 - United States v. Antelope 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
. '• 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
j;upumt Qfllltlillf tlrt~b j;mttg 
'Jllfrur~ 19. <!J. zo~n.~ 
April 13, 1977 
Re: No. 75-661, United States v. Antelope 
Dear Chief, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court 
in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 





' . . ·, 
~u:prtnU Qf01trl .Ltf t4t ~tb, ~taftg 
._rutlp:ttghm. ~. <!f. 2llgt~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
April 13, 1977 
Re: No. 75-661 - United States v. Antelope 
Dear Chief: 
A propos our discussion of your circulating opinion 
in the above entitled case this afternoon, I offer the 
following language as a substitute for present footnote 9. 
I think in light of difficult and undecided questions as 
to the extent of the jurisdiction of Indian tribal courts 
and the like, it is important to cite cases such as those 
included in the proposed substitute footnote, not to 
make anything out of them in this case, but simply to show 
that they remain good law and that the language which you 
necessarily use in your opinion about Indian "sovereignty" 
is not to be taken with complete literalness. 
Since Lewis indicated in his join letter to you that 
re was also suggesting minor changes, I am taking the 
liberty of sending a copy of this letter to him. 
The Chief Justice 





Proposed addition to Antelope, footnote 9 
_/ Congress has provided for federal jurisdiction 
over the crime of murder on the reservation, much as on 
other federal enclaves, 18 U.S.C. § 1111, 1153. But as 
our opinions have recognized that Indian reservations differ 
in certain respects from other federal enclaves, the statute 
has been construed as not encompassing crimes on the reserva-
tion by non-Indians against non-Indians. United States v. 
McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881); see Surplus Trading Co. 
v. Cook, 281 u.s. 647, 651 (1930); Williams v. Lee, 358 
U.S. 217, 219-220 (1959); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm., 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973). The statute does not 
single out Indian defendants; non-Indian defendants are also 
covered if the victim was a member of the tribe. 
.:%u:prtm~ QJ~nrt Gf tlr~ 'J!lttit~b ;itat~g ' 
~agfrittghm. ~. QJ. 2ll~J!..;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
April 14, 1977 
Re: No. 75-661 - United States v. Antelope 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to Conference 
·.• 
CHAMBERS Of" 
THE CHIEF" JUSTICE 
~uprtmt Qfttud ttf tqt 'J!lnitt.b ~tatt~ 
'J.iaglyingtttn. ~. <q. 21lbl'l-~ 
April 14, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: 75-661 United States v. Antelope 
Enclosed is the first print draft of the opinion. 
Further reflection suggests to me that I should omit the 
tangential references to the death penalty potential. 
Notes 5, 10, and 13 have been modified by excisions, 
and a small addition is added to Note 9 for emphasis. 
There is no substantive change from the typed copy 




-.:§u:p-uutt <qanri of tltl' ~ttitcb .,§ifa.ttg 
'Jl ag Jrl:n¢01t. tB. <q. zo gT J.J. .;t 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN April 14, 1977 
Re: No . 75-661 - United States v. Antelope 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me . 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
;§uvuutt .<!Jnnrt .of t~:c ~b .:§tiOlU.s: 
1Jl!l'aslyhtgtcn. ~. <If. 2!lp.1J.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM.J . BRENNAN, JR. 
April 14, 1977 




The Chief Justice 









, April 14, 1977 
No. 75-661 ' United States v. Antelope 
Dear Chief: 
I would be. ·happy to have you add the footnote suggested 
in Bill ·Rehnquist's letter of April 13. 
Sincerely, 
~ 'if 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/sa 









~ttpume OJ!ttttt cf tl.rt 2lfuittb ~taft$ 
jiht!flyhtgtcti. i§. OJ. 211&!~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
April 15, 1977 
Re: No. 75-661 - United States v. Antelope 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
~· 
The Chief Justice 
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jiu:prtmt "tourt of tqt 'Jllttitt~ ~tattg 
1lJagfriu:gtttn, ~. "t· 2llpJI-~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL April 15, 1977 
Re: No: 75-661, United States v. Antelope 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice .. 
cc: The Conference 
rt. ~I' 
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